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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Authority to Determine Coverage of Walsh-
Healey Act-Secretary of Labor, under Walsh-Healey Act relating to
hours and wages of persons employed on government contracts,' issued a
subpoena 2 ordering defendant, holder of a contract to furnish shoes for the
government, to produce payroll records of plants which, although not
named in the contract, manufactured parts used in constructing the shoes.3
Federal district court refused Secretary's petition to enforce the subpoena; 4
reversed by the circuit court of appeals.5 Held (two justices dissenting), 6
affirmed; Secretary of Labor, not the courts, has authority in first instance
to determine whether separate plants of government contractor are within
coverage of the Act. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501
(1943).
The constitutionality of statutes conferring upon federal courts juris-
diction to enforce administrative subpoenas 7 and compel testimony was
established in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,s and subse-
quent decisions 9 have reiterated the holding on the theory that appropriate
1. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. A. §§ 35-45 (Supp. 1942). The Act pro-
vides that in any contract with the United States for manufacture of materials in
amount exceeding $io,ooo persons employed are to be paid not less than the minimum
wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor, and shall not be permitted to work in
excess of 40 hours in any one week.
2. Secretary of Labor is empowered to administer the provisions of the Act, to
make investigations and inquiries, to hold hearings, and to issue orders requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence under oath.
3. The contracts with the defendant were entered into, pursuant to conditions of
the Act, between Oct. 26, 1936, and June 8, 1938. Thereafter, in 1939, the Secretary
issued rulings which provided that materials or supplies manufactured in integrated
establishments and used in fulfilling the contract, should conform to the provisions of
the Walsh-Healey Act.
4. 37 F. Supp. 604 (N. D. N. Y. 194i) and 40 F. Supp. 254 (N. D. N. Y. i941).
Federal district court based its decision upon the ground that the plant in question
not being within the coverage of the Act, the Secretary was unauthorized to obtain the
plant's books.
5. 128 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
6. Justices Murphy and Roberts.
7. The Walsh-Healey Act in part provides! "... In case of contumacy, failure,
or refusal of any person to obey such an order, any district court of the United States
. shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to
appear before him or representative designated by him, to produce evidence if, as and
when so ordered, and to give testimony relating to the matter under investigation or in
question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said
court as a contempt thereof. . . !' 41 U. S. C. A. § 39 (Supp. i942).
8. 154 U. S. 447 (1894)_ Although the question was decided by the federal court
in In i'e Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241 (N. D. Calif. 1887) "it was seven
years later before this question of the power of an administrative body to compel testi-
inony through the courts was brought before the Supreme Court. . , ." Lilienthal,
The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony (925) 39 HARv. L. REv.
694, 703.
9. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938) ; General Tobacco
and Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942). "It is unreason-
able to assume that Congress intended that one who, when called upon to produce his
books and records, denies that he is engaged in transactions within the purview of the
Act should be refused a hearing upon that issue before his privacy is invaded in deroga-
tion of his individual immunity from unreasonable search of his papers and effects."
Id. at 599. Contra: Katzenback v. Tomadelli Corp., io2 N. J. Eq. 186, 14o Atl. 26
(1928) (What amounted to an order to obey an administrative subpoena was granted
without a hearing over defendant's denial of statutory jurisdiction and demand for a
hearing).
(563)
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defenses may be made to the administrator's application for enforcement by
the court. The power to punish for contempt, however, has not been
bestowed directly upon federal 10 administrative agencies by legislative
action. Heretofore, only after the court had determined the validity of the
subpoena would it issue an order, disobedience of which constituted con-
tempt. 1' Although indicative of the present trend to broaden the powers
of administrative agencies, 12 the decision in the instant case seems incon-
sistent with the traditionally accepted view that federal administrative
agencies are in themselves powerless to compel obedience to subpcenas.' 3
By abolishing the discretionary power of the court and forcing it to comply
with the wishes of the Secretary in enforcement proceedings, 4 the present
decision would in effect place the sanction of punishment for contempt in
the hands of the Secretary of Labor, thus permitting her to do indirectly
what she could not validly accomplish by direct action. That such power
would be constitutional if granted by legislation is debatable; 15 that in
many situations it would expedite administrative action which otherwise
would be seriously hampered is conceded. However, such authority hardly
can be inferred from the statute as it now stands, and it is doubtful that
Congress intended to attain this result by the more circuitous method of
automatic judicial action.16
io. The rule in respect to state agencies is not well settled; some states holding
that the agency can enforce its subpmenas, and others adhering to the federal view.
Ii. General Tobacco and Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 6th,
I942). "In the exercise of the judicial power to review questions of law, as conferred
by an Act of Congress, the seal of a United States Court should not become a mere
rubber stamp for the approval of arbitrary action by an administrative agency." Id. at
599.
12. For an analysis and illustrations of the increasing use of administrative justice
see Feller, Administrative Justice (z938) 27 StnvEy GlAPHIc 494.
13. ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE iN GOVERNMENT AGENcIEs: REPORT OF THE CoM-
mTrz ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE, APPOINTm BY THE ATromEY-GENErA, Ap-
pendix K (i94z).
z4. Cf. SEC v. Tung Corporation of America, 32 F. Supp. 371 (N. D. IIl. 1940)
reported in 54 HARV. L. REv. 129 (i94o) (SEC, suspecting defendant corporation was
dealing in unregistered securities, subpmnaed defendant to produce certain documents.SEC petitioned court upon defendant's refusal to appear. Held, defendant is entitledto a hearing at which SEC must demonstrate to the court a basis for enforcement of
the subpcena). A possible distinction between the holdings of this case and the instant
case is found in a difference in wording of the two statutes involved. The Securities
Act provided that in case of refusal to obey a subpoena a district court may issue an
order to appear. The Walsh-Heale- Act uses the phrase, shall have jurisdiction to
issue an order. If this evidences an intent of Congress to make the action of the court
in the latter statute compulsory as compared with the discretion allowed in the Securi-
ties Act, it fails from faulty draftsmanship.
15. In a discussion of the Interstate Commerce Commission the suggestion is made,
which would be equally applicable to the Department of Labor, "Thus if a federal
statute or amendment were now enacted conferring upon our noble Interstate Com-
merce Commission, under certain limited circumstances, authority to punish for con-
tempt, the ponderables would likely outweigh the imponderables." Albertsworth, Ad-
ministrative Contempt Powers: A Problem in Technique (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 954,
956.
i6. As is pointed out in the vigorous dissenting opinion, ". Congress evidently
intended to keep the instant subpcena power within limits, and clearly must have
meant for the courts to perform more than a routine ministerial function in passing
upon such applications. If this were not the case, it would have been much simpler to
lodge the power of enforcement directly with the Secretary, or else to make disregard
of his subpcenas a misdemeanor." Instant case at 512.
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Conflict of Laws-Effect to Be Given Foreign Decrees of Divorce
Where Service on Absentee Defendant is by Publication-Defend-
ants obtained divorce decrees in Nevada from North Carolina spouses who
were served by publication. Defendants then married and returned to
North Carolina where they were indicted for bigamous cohabitation.' On
the court's charge that the Nevada decrees were invalid since they did not
conform to North Carolina requirements for recognition of foreign
divorces,2 defendants were convicted. The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction.' Held (two justices dissenting) reversed.
Nevada's jurisdiction being admitted, its decrees are entitled to full faith
and credit in North Carolina. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 63
Sup. Ct. 207 (I942).
Under the Constitution, full faith and credit must be given in one
state to the judgments of a sister state. 4 However, an exception was tra-
ditionally said to exist where such recognition would grossly offend the
local public policy. This exception, announced more in dicta than in deci-
sions,5 is today regarded by the more liberal view as without merit, since
public policy varies only slightly, in fact, between states. It nevertheless
was embodied in the much discussed case of Haddock v. Haddock," decided
on the facts of the instant case by a split courtJ which the instant case
overrules.8  As state divorce laws at variance with one another can easily
I. See NORTH CAROLINA CODE (939) § 4342: "If any person, being married, shall
contract a marriage with any other person outside of this state, which marriage would
be punishable as bigamous if contracted within this state, and shall thereafter cohabit
with such person in this state, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished as in
cases of bigamy. Nothing contained in this section shall extend . . . to any person
who at the time of such marriage shall have been lawfully divorced from the bond of
the first marriage' Thus the validity of the Nevada divorces was placed squarely in
issue in the North Carolina trial.
2. Pridgen v. Pridgen, 203 N. C. 533, 166 S. E. 59i (1932), laid down the rule
that a foreign divorce, based on substituted service and where the defendant made no
appearance, would not be recognized in North Carolina.
3. State v. Williams, 22o N. C. 460, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1942).
4. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § I. This section provides, in addition, that "Congress
may by General Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." This power was exercised. The Act of
May 26, 1790, REV. STAT. § 905 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. § 687 (1934) provides that judg-
ments "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United
States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are
taken." These provisions have been interpreted to mean that "not some, but full" faith
and credit must be given such judgments. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 40 (r938).
5. Cases where the foreign judgment in question was penal, or where it purported
to govern the disposition of realty in the forum, furnish good examples. See Bradford
Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, i6o (1931); Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 6II,
615 (914) ; Mr. Justice Holmes, concurring in Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 14 (9o9) ;
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 666 (1892). But in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 21o
U. S. 230 (igo8), the Supreme Court squarely held that a foreign judgment would not
be denied full faith and credit on the single ground of local policy; and in Broderick
v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642 (I934) Mr. Justice Brandeis states: "... the room left
for the play of conflicting policies is a narrow one."
6. 201 U. S. 562 (igo6). The Haddock case, both because of the important social
implications involved in the problem, and because of the widely divergent views of the
members of the court that decided it (see note 7 infra) has evoked wide comment
among the writers. See Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 417;
Strahorn, The Supreme Court Revisits Haddock (938) 33 ILL. L. REV-. 412; Holt,
Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock? (I941) 39 MicH. L. Ray. 689.
7. The Supreme Court split 5 to 4 in the Haddock case, Justices Brewer, Brown,
Harlan, and Holmes dissenting. Both Mr. Justice Brown and Mr. Justice Holmes
wrote opinions. The Holmes opinion, stressing the social undesirability of the result
reached by the majority, is especially forceful, and is repeatedly cited by the majority
opinion in the instant case.
8. Instant case at 216.
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cause grave consequences, 9 it seems clear that uniformity in the matter o
recognition of foreign decrees is essential. Therefore, the newer view, sus-
tained by this decision, is far preferable to the older one; and all such
decrees rendered by a court having competent jurisdiction must now be
sustained in every other state regardless of the local laws concerning
requirements for divorce and recognition of foreign decrees. In regard to
the instant case it must be stressed that the Nevada decrees are not ren-
dered immune from all attack. If the jury had found that the defendants
had secured their divorces in fraud on the Nevada court, such decrees
would not be entitled to full faith and credit,10 since Nevada would have
acted without jurisdiction. And the majority opinion unambiguously as-
serts that it is not passing on the question of Nevada's jurisdiction." The
risks arising when the defaulting spouse obtains a foreign divorce are con-
siderable even under the instant decision: an indictment for bigamy, a
cloud on title to his property on his death intestate,12 and the bastardization
of the children under his second marriage 13 represent some of the possible
consequences. But since a decision allowing the forum to refuse full faith
and credit on the ground of public policy would transform these possibili-
ties into absolute reality, 14 being based, in addition, on the fiction that
9. "Under the circumstances of this case (if the Haddock case were followed), a
man would have two wives, a wife two husbands. The reality of a sentence to prison
proves that that is no mere play on words. Each would be a bigamist for living in one
state with the only one with whom the other state will permit him lawfully to live.
Children of the second marriage would be bastards in one state but legitimate in the
other." Instant case at 214.
io. Bell v. Bell, 18i U. S. 175 (19oo).
ii. Although the trial judge had instructed the jury that if it found the defend-
ants had procured the Nevada divorces through fraud on the Nevada court, the defend-
ants were guilty of bigamy (since Nevada would not then have had jurisdiction over
either party to the suit), the verdict returned against defendants was a general one,
not specifying the grounds of the conviction; and under the rule of Stromberg v. Cal-
ifornia, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (ig3o), if one of the admitted grounds for conviction is in-
valid because unconstitutional, the conviction cannot be sustained. And Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority, states at 210: "If the case had been tried and sub-
mitted on that issue only (the issue of fraud), we would have quite a different prob-
lem, as Bell v. Bell indicates. We have no occasion to meet that issue now and we
intimate no opinion on it. . . . Rather we must treat the present case . . . as if peti-
tioners had . . . long ago acquired a permanent abode there" (in Nevada, so that
there could be no question of fraud).
It is to be noted that this carefully worked out distinction was not drawn by Mr.
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion, which rests essentially on the assumption that
the defendants were convicted on the ground of fraud alone.
22. The majority opinion states, at 210: "But we do not agree with the theory of
the Haddock case that, so far as the marital status of the parties is concerned, a decree
. . . need not be given full faith and credit." A footnote then explains: "Thus we
have here no question as to extraterritorial effect of a divorce decree insofar as it
affects property in another state." This qualifying language would not appear to con-
template disturbing the rule, laid down in Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. i (9o9) and fol-
lowed in Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386 (19o9), that a judgment governing the
disposition of foreign realty need not be accorded full faith and credit.
13. Since the decree may still be held on remand, invalid as a fraud under the
Bell case.
14. If the rule of the Haddock case were followed, no showing of fraud would be
necessary; the forum could deny recognition of the foreign divorce, on policy grounds,
wherever it did not conform to the forum's law on the subject. This would have the
practical effect of virtually insuring the bastardization of the children of the second
marriage, since in almost every case the foreign law will be different, the foreign
divorce having been secured for the precise purpose of evading the requirements of the
local law on the subject.
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"domicile" follows the domicile of the innocent rather than the culpable
spouse,15 it must be concluded that the majority opinion reaches the better
result.
Income Tax-Taxability to Grantor of Income of Trust for the
Benefit of the Grantor's Minor Children-Taxpayer created separate
trusts for his minor children, giving trustees authority to devote so much
of the net income of the trust property as "to them shall seem advisable"
to the "education, support and maintenance" of the beneficiary. Except
for a relatively small amount the income was retained by the trustees and
added to the principal. The lower court 1 ruled that only the income actu-
ally distributed was taxable to the grantor.2 Held, since all of the income
could in the discretion of the trustees 3 be distributed in discharge of the
grantor's legal obligation to support his minor children, the entire income
was taxable to grantor under § 167 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code.4
Helvering v. Stuart, 63 Sup. Ct. 14o (1942).
Section 167 of the Revenue Act of 1934 was intended by Congress to
combat the ever-increasing -avoidance of the higher bracket surtax rates
through the device of creating trusts, the income of which remained in sub-
stance at the disposal of the grantor (creator) of the trust.5 This was
merely a specific application to trusts of a general income tax doctrine that
money expended by A in payment of a legal obligation of B was taxable
income to B.6 Since a parent is legally obligated to support his minor chil-
dren, under this section the income of a trust created for the benefit of
grantor's minor children has been held to be income of the grantor, but
prior to the instant case, only to the extent that it was used for such sup-
15. See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in the Haddock case, at 630: "(This
theory) is a pure fiction, and fiction is always a poor ground for changing substantial
rights." Moreover, there is neither practical nor legal justification for making juris-
diction depend on the culpability or innocence of a party; it will force a purely legal
question, that of jurisdiction, to depend on the finding of a fact extraneous to the suit
altogether. For excellent analyses of this phase of the problem, see Bingham, The
American Law Institute v. The Supreme Court-In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock
(1936) 21 CoRx. L. Q. 393, 46; Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile (97) 27 YALE
L. J. 49.
i. Stuart v. Commissioner, 124 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 7th, i94I).
2. This decision followed the rule laid down by the Treasury Department in
GCM. No. 18972, 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 231, after acquiescing in the decision of E. E.
Black, 36 B. T. A. 346 (I937).
3. Trustees were grantor, his wife, and his brother. Since the wife and brother
were not beneficiaries, they had no substantial interest in the distribution of the trust
income, adverse to that of the grantor. Hall v. Welch, 37 F. Supp. 788, 792 (D. Mass.
1941) (interest of trustees, as such, is not adverse to grantor's interest) ; Morton v.
Commissioner, iog F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 7th, i94o) (commercial trustees' interest held
to be neither substantial nor adverse).
4. Revenue Act of 1934, § 67 (a) "... where any part of the income of a trust
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substan-
tial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income, be distributed to the
grantor; . . . then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing
the net income of the grantor."
5. Helvering v. Stuart, 63 Sup. Ct. 140, 147 (1942) (citing SEN. REP. NO. 665,
72d Cong, 1st Sess. (1932) 34-35). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Revenue Act of
1934, Art. 167-I (b).
6. Old Colony Trust Company v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (i929) (payment
by petitioner's employer of tax due on petitioner's income for the previous year was
to be included in petitioner's gross income for the year in which it was paid) ; Douglas
v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. I (935) (doctrine applied to income of an alimony trust);
Commissioner v. Grosvenor, 85 F. (2d) 2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (trust for the benefit
of grantor's minor daughters).
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port.7 The decision of the instant case extends the grantor's tax liability
to the whole of the income of the trust, regardless of the amount used for
such support." The court reached the conclusion that under the wording
of the statute it was not the actual payment of trust income to grantor, but
the possibility of such payment that was to be treated as income to the
grantorY This would seem to bd a proper treatment of trusts which permit
payments directly to the grantor of any part, or all, of the trust income.
However, where the trust income is income to the grantor, not because of
the possibility of payment to him, but only because of the possibility
that trustees can satisfy some legal obligation of the grantor out of
trust income, it seems clear that if the trust income exceeds the amount
of the obligation, there is no logic in treating the excess as income
of the grantor. In the opinion of the lower court the propriety of such a
limitation was recognized, 10 but the Supreme Court ignored this issue.
Since the extent of a parent's liability to support minor children is a matter
of state law, the proper amount of trust income to be treated as income of
the grantor may be determined by reference to the statutes and court deci-
sions of the state in which the parent resides. 1' And since the basis for
taxing the grantor is that the trust income represents gross income to him
to the extent of his ability to shift the payment of this legal obligation to
the trustee, limiting tax liability to the maximum amount of the obligation
would seem in accord with the legislative intent.
Judgment-Validity of Judgment Lien Against Land Conveyed
to Terre-tenant After Expiration of the Lien Against Judgment
Debtor-Land subject to a judgment lien was conveyed to terre-
tenant. The lien was not revived against the judgment debtor or the terre-
tenant within five years of the entry of the judgment. Held, the lien con-
tinued against the land conveyed to terre-tenant five years from the date
7. Commissioner v. Grosvenor, 85 F. (2d) 2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (grantor taxed
on amounts paid directly to the beneficiaries, which in the absence of proof to the con-
trary are assumed to have been spent for their support) ; Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T.
A. 1151, 1,57 (1940) (trustees had the same discretion and grantor was taxed on the
amount spent) ; Percy M. Chandler, 41 B. T. A. i65, 178 (940) (holding none of the
trust income taxable to grantor where trustees had discretion as to the amount to be
spent in support of beneficiaries, but none was so used) ; Martin F. Tiernan, 37 B. T.
A. 1o48, Io34 (i94o) ; E. E. Black, 36 B. T. A. 346 (i937).
8. This extension of the rule was forecast by a decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals in 1939. J. S. Pyeatt, 39 B. T. A. 774, 780 (1939) (where grantor had re-
served the privilege of drawing a limited portion of the trust income to reimburse him
for the expense of supporting the infant beneficiary, grantor was held taxable on the
maximum amount which he could receive, rather than on the small amounts actually
paid him by trustees).
9. Revenue Act of 1934, § 167 (a) "... where any part of the income . . . (2)
may . . . be distributed to the grantor; . . . then such part . . . shall be included
in computing the net income of the grantor."
io. ". . . such obligation is, of course, limited to a reasonable allowance consistent
with the taxpayer's station in life and the minor's welfare." Stuart v. Commissioner,
124 F. (2d) 772, 780 (C. C. A. 7th, I94i).
ii. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933). In the state of Illinois, for
example, where grantor resides, it has been held that the factors to be considered in
determining the proper amount to be paid by a father to foster parents for the support
and maintenance of his minor children, were the fathers income and station in life.
Charbonneau v. Norton, 263 Ill. App. 341 (1932).
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on which terre-tenant recorded his deed.' Simmons v. Simmons, i5o Pa.
Super. 393, 28 A. (2d) 445, and gllinger v. Krach, 15o Pa. Super. 384, 28
A. (2d) 453.
The majority followed a rule of property 2 developed from a series of
decisions 8 interpreting the Act of April 16, 1849.4 The rule is stated: "It
[the lien] was to continue five years from the date the terre-tenant's deed
was recorded, under the act of 1849." 5 But as applied to the facts of the
instant cases this interpretation does not conform with the terms of the
statute. It disregards entirely the opening phrase, "In all cases when a
judgment has been, or shall be regularly revived between the original par-
ties ... . " 6 In previous cases before the appellate courts, the require-
ment of revival between the original parties was never questioned as the
statute was literally complied with in each case by issuance of a writ of sd.
fa. by amicable agreement between the original parties," or by the death
of the judgment debtor.9 The rule formulated from them was in part dic-
tum, therefore, for its application extended beyond their decisions. The
dissenting judges in the instant cases follow the statute, construing it
strictly, and find that it has no application to the instant facts. And this
has been the holding in two of three recent common pleas cases,10 in which a
lien was attempted to be revived against a terre-tenant after the creditor
had slept on his rights against the original debtor for the statutory period.
Whether the judicial rule was formulated inadvertently without due con-
sideration of the instant situation, or was a form of intentional judicial
I. In Simmons v. Simmons, the judgment debtor died more than five years after
the judgment, but before the action was brought. In Ellinger v. Krach, the judgment
debtor had not died at the time of the action. This difference between the facts of the
cases is not controlling on their decisions.
2. It is so called by Chief Justice Kephart in Farmers National Bank and Trust
Co. of Reading, to use v. Barrett et al., 321 Pa. 273 (1936). See I LADNE, CoNvEY-
ANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA (2d ed. 194I) 447, rule II, cited in Simmons v. Simmons,
at 28 A. (2d) 451.
3. Uhler v. Moses, 200 Pa. 498 (igoi) ; Kefover et al. v. Hustead et al., 294 Pa.
474 (1928); Farmers National Bank and Trust Co. of Reading, to use v. Barrett et
a., 321 Pa. 273 (936) ; First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Miller et al., 322 Pa.
473 (1936) ; Everett Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Calhoun, 121 Pa. Super. 451 (1936).
4. "In all cases when a judgment has been or shall be regularly revived between
the original parties, the period of five years, during which the lien of the judgment
continues, shall only commence to run in favor of the terre-tenant from the time that
he or she has placed their deed on record: Provided, That this act shall not apply to
any cases which have been finally adjudicated, or when the terre-tenant is in actual
possession of the land bound by such judgment, by himself or tenant. P. L663, § 8,
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I931) fit. x2, § 872.
5. Uhler v. Moses, 2oo Pa. 498 (igo).
6. P. L. 663, § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 872.
7. First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Miller et al., 322 Pa. 473 (1936) ; Uhler
v. Moses, 2oo Pa. 498 (igoi).
8. Farmers National Bank and Trust Co. of Reading, to use v. Barrett et al., 32z
Pa. 273 (936); Everett Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Calhoun, 121 Pa. Super. 451
(1936) ; First National Bank of Ashley v. Tomichek et al., 14o Pa. Super. or (194o).
9. Kefover et al. v. Husfead et al., 294 Pa. 474 (1928).
io. Italo-French Produce Co. v. Dellapa, and Zeno, terre-tenant, I Pa. D. & C.
216 (1921) ; Lewis v. Puchy et al., 44 Pa. D. & C. 482 (1942). Contra: Klein et al.
v. Anderson et ux., 39 Pa. D. & C. 139 (1940) (lien held invalid on procedural
grounds).
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legislation to extend the scope of the statute,1 it should not overrule the
unrepealed 12 statute, its meaning being clear, and the purpose of which was
not to provide the creditor with an additional remedy, but rather to pre-
serve his existing legal remedy against unrecorded conveyances of land by
the judgment debtor.' 3 The result reached by the majority in the instant
decisions is incongruous. The negligent creditor who has let the statutory
period pass without revival of the lien against the debtor is now given a
further remedy because of the fortunate circumstance that the debtor's
land was conveyed and the deed recorded in the interim.
Parties: Interpretation of Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tort-feasors Act-Plaintiff brought suit against defendant for dam-
ages sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant obtained leave of the
court to serve summons on three other parties as third-party defendants,
who pleaded the general issue. The original plaintiff failed to amend his
pleadings to include the new parties.2 The evidence as to the facts of the
accident was conflicting. Verdict was directed in favor of the third-party
defendants on the basis of testimony of plaintiff. Defendant's request for
charge that proximate cause be considered as related to the third-party
defendants was refused. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff against orig-
inal defendant. Held (one judge dissenting), affirmed; the question of
third-party defendant's acts as a proximate cause of the accident was prop-
erly withheld from the jury because the testimony of the plaintiff was suffi-
cient to exonerate them.3  Brotman v. McNanara, 29 A. (2d) 264 (Md.
1942).
ii. Klein et al. v. Anderson et ux., 39 Pa. D. & C. 139 (1940), affording an excel-
lent review of this line of cases, at p. 147: "The lien of the original judgment contin-
ues as a lien against the land of a terre-tenant for five years from the recording of the
deed. The Act of 1849 has.to include original judgments as well as revivals, in order
to establish a uniform rule of property. . . . When we eliminate the error (italics
mine) that the Act of 1849 applies only to revivals, it is then that the acts of assembly,
and the decisions of the Supreme Court make a consistent whole, in accord with right
reason, justice, and equity." Judge Wilson submits that the limiting clause in the Act of
1849 was an "error", and must be judicially amended to make a workable rule of prop-
erty. With this we cannot agree. The language and intent of the Act of 1849 are clear,
see infra note 13, and should not be distorted to conform to a subsequent judicial inter-
pretation.
12. Uhler v. Moses, 200 Pa. 498 (1go), held that the Act of June i, 1887, P. L.
289, § I, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193) tit. 12, § 868, amending the Act of March 26,
1827, P. L. 129, § I, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 868, did not repeal the
Act of April i6, 1849.
13. The Act of March 26, 1827, P. L. 129, § I, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931)
tit. 12, § 868, provided that no judgment should continue a lien for more than five years
from its entry or revival, unless revived within that period, by agreement of the parties
and terre-tenants, or by a writ of sci. fa. This led to the practice of conveyance to a
terre-tenant, who would fail to record his deed or enter into possession, making it im-
possible for the judgment creditor to revive the lien as to him. Armstrong's App., 5
W. & S. 352 (1843). To correct this, the Act of 1849 was passed providing that the
period of five years shall begin to run in favor of the terre-tenant only after his deed
is recorded, provided the judgment be regularly revived between the original parties.
1. Maryland, Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1941.
2. The court in the instant case evades the question of the effect of this failure. It
seems clear, however, that it would not militate against the rights of the defendant
against the third-party defendants.
3. The testimony of the third-party defendants, which incriminated each other and
both of which contradicted the plaintiff, was considered insufficient to take that issue
to the jury.
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The Uniform Contribution among Joint Tort-feasors Act, which was
embodied in the Maryland statute, was drafted because of dissatisfaction
with the common law negligence rules. At common law contribution among
joint tort-feasors was not allowed.4 The joint liability theory is to make
each participant in a tort satisfy the judgment in proportion to his negli-
gence, the plaintiff being denied recovery pro tanto his contributory negli-
gence.5 The effective application of this theory requires that all interde-
pendent claims arising out of one transaction be adjudicated in one proceed-
ing, since the apportionment of liability in one suit is not binding in a later
action involving the third party." The court in the instant case was of the
opinion that the defendant had full opportunity to present his claim against
the third-party defendants, as well as his defense against the plaintiff. The
argument was that the third-party defendants were cleared of any negli-
gence by the plaintiff's evidence, the evidence implicating the third-party
defendants not being sufficient to take the issue of their negligence to the
jury. The sufficiency of this evidence is the sole point of divergence between
the majority and dissenting opinions. The court, by admitting the evidence
of the plaintiff as to the lack of negligence of the third-party defendants,
even though the plaintiff did not amend to include them, was entirely con-
sonant with the theory of the act: to adjudicate all claims arising out of
the same transaction in one proceeding. There were, in effect, two law-
suits in the same proceeding: plaintiff v. defendant and defendant (third-
party plaintiff) v. third-party defendants,7 with the plaintiff a witness in
the latter suit. Since the original defendant, having a right to do so, failed
to introduce any evidence implicating the third-party defendants, it may
be assumed that he had none. Therefore, it appears that the defendant's
claim against the third-party defendants has been properly heard, and the
purposes of the act fulfilled.
Torts-Charities-Liability of Charitable Corporation for Negli-
gence of Servant-Plaintiff, a special nurse, seeks recovery from hos-
pital for injury caused by negligence of defendant's employee.' Defendant
4. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. i86 (K. B. i799).
5. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBTION IN NEGLIGENcE AcrioNs (1936).
But in the instant case, by omission of § 2 (4) of the Uniform Act, which provides for
pro rata distribution among the joint tort-feasors, the Maryland act seems to provide
only for equal distribution of loss among the joint tort-feasors. But by the inclusion
of § 7 of the Uniform Act as § 27 of the Maryland act, the third-party defendant may
counterclaim against the original plaintiff, which implies that the original plaintiff is
thus denied recovery pro tanto his contributory negligende.
6. GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8o. Cf. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Trans.
Co., 261 N. Y. i59, 184 N. E. 744 (i933) ; Michel v. McKenna, i99 Wis. 6o8, 227 N.W. 396 (1929).
7. GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 31; Anderson v. MacKenzie (1934) 1 W. W.
R. 192 and 303 (B. C. Sup. C.). In Mara v. Hartley the Ontario court, whose rem-
edy and procedure on this subject is very similar to the Uniform Act, said, "The Leg-
islature could not have intended the right to contribution between wrongdoers to
depend upon the election of the plaintiff as to whom he will sue." 39 0. W. N. 519,
521 (x93i). See Scharine v. Huebsch, 2o3 Wis. 261, 267, 234 N. W. 358, 36o (ig3i).
i. The plaintiff in this case was a special nurse; she was assigned to the case by
the Georgetown Hospital and paid by the patient whom she attended. Having suffered
injuries as a result of the negligent conduct of a student nurse, she now sues the de-
fendant as operator of the hospital on respondeat superior principles. She comes under
the legal heading of a stranger to the charity, as contrasted with a beneficiary. One
whom a charity is designed to help bears the legal relationship of beneficiary to the
charity. All others, employees, visitors, third parties, etc, come under the legal term
of strangers to the charity.
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appeals from an adverse judgment in the Federal District Court. Held,
judgment affirmed. President and Directors of Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 13o F. (2nd) 8io (App. D. C. 1942).
The general rule that charitable corporations are not liable in tort
actions, 2 is a principle of immunity which came to the United States as an
application of a repudiated English decision; a and many authorities are
opposed to it.' In its course of development it has been subjected to vari-
ous types of modifications, one of the most important of which is based on
the relation of the person injured to the charity.5 Some states have broken
away from the doctrine of complete immunity and impose liability if the
person harmed is a stranger 6 to the charity,7 the principle adopted by three
of the judges 8 in the instant case.9 Other jurisdictions hhve extended the
liability still further to protect paying beneficiaries as well as strangers. 0
And finally, several states have granted recovery without distinction be-
2. Arkansas Valley Co-op. Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 2oo Ark. 883, 141 S. W.
(2d) 538 (i94o) ; Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488,
17 N. E. (2d) 1012 (1938) ; Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital and Nurses Training School,
135 Kan. 3o6, 10 P. (2d) 859 (932) ; Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 4oo,
236 S. W. 577 (ig2i) ; Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130
Md. 265, 7oo AtL 307 (7917) ; Zoulalian v. New England Sanitorium and Benevolent
Ass'n, 230 Mass. 7o2, 7i9 N. E. 686 (19z8) ; Eads v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n,
325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. (2d) 707 (930) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254,
75 Atl. i087 (i970) ; Waldman v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 227 Wis. 43, 277 N.
W. 632 (7938).
3. The first American case dealing specifically with the tort liability of charitable
corporations is believed to be McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 72o Mass.
432 (7876). In holding such a corporation immune, the court in this case followed a
rule laid down in an English case, Holliday v. St. Leonard, ii C. B. (x. s.) 192
(1867), apparently not knowing that it had already been reversed by Foreman v. Mayor
of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1877).
4. HAaEa , THE LAW o, ToRTs (933) § 294, says: "The modern view holds
charitable corporations liable quite as though they were operating for profit, and the
problem of tort liability is no different than in the case of any other corporation. .. "
Also, PRossER, TouRs (i94i) io7g, and Feezer, Tort Liability of Charities (1928) 77
U. OF PA. L. Rav. 191.
5. Another type of exception rests on who is responsible for the injury, imposing
liability for the negligence of managing officials but not for that of minor employees,
Old Folks' and Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts, 83 Ind. App. 546, 149 N. E. I88
(0925). Still another type depends on where the injury occurs, holding liability for
injury on the public streets, Daniels v. Rahway Hospital, io N. J. Misc. 585, i6o At.
644 (1932), but not for harm within the institution, Boeckel v. Orange Memorial Hos-
pital, io8 N. J. L. 453, 158 Atl. 832 (1932).
6. For an explanation of the distinction between stranger and beneficiary, see note
I supra.
7. Cohen v. General Hospital Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. i88, 154 Atl. 435
(93) ; St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, z95 Ind. 350, z44 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Andrews
v. Young Men's Christian Assn, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (939); Bruce v. Cen-
tral Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, iio N. W. 951 (i9o7); Marble v.
Nicholas Senn Hospital Ass'n, io2 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 2o8 (i918) ; Daniels v. Rah-way Hospital, io N. J. Misc. 585, i6o At. 644 (79)32); Cowans v. North Carolina
Baptist Hospitals, Inc., 797 NX]. C. 47, 747 5. E. 672 (7929) ; Pflugfelder v. Convent of
Good Shepherd, 55 Ohio App. i58, g N. E. (2d) 4 (7936) ; Weston's Adm'x v. Hospi-
tal of St. Vincent of Paul, 737 Va. 587, 707 S. E. 785 (7927) ; Heckman v. Sisters of
Charity of House of Providence, 5 Wash. (2d) 6g9, iO6 P. (2d) 593 (7940).
8. Chief Justice Groner, Justice Stephens, and Justice Vinson.
9. Circuit Court decisions which have held there was no liability to beneficiaries
include: Higgins v. Pratt Institute, 45 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; Ettinger v.
Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 3 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Baden-
heimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F. (2d) 5o7 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
io. Silva v. Providence Hospital, 74 Cal. (2d) 762, 97 P. (2d) 798 (1939) ; Mor-
ton v. Savannah Hospital, 748 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (i918).
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tween strangers and beneficiaries," the theory followed by the remaining
three judges in the instant decision. 12 Those favoring immunity have
argued that liability would waste the corporate fund and would violate the
purpose of gifts to charity. 18 However, the risk is an insurable one, and
charitable corporations have continued to thrive in those states which im-
pose liability. Furthermore, it is improbable that the matter of tort liability
has ever deterred contributions to charity. Immunity has also been justi-
fied on the theory of an implied waiver by the beneficiary; yet if the bene-
ficiary were asked to sign such a waiver, seldom would he agree. 14 In
opposition to immunity, one can rationalize that since individuals and part-
nerships are held liable for torts committed while bestowing charitable serv-
ices, the corporate charity, which is certainly better able to bear the burden
of liability than is an individual, should be held to the same standard. In
business or other activity the form of organization makes no difference in
the liability; it should be immaterial here also. The fact that three of the
judges could have imposed liability on the stranger theory, as did their
colleagues, but refused to do so and instead went further to extend protec-
tion without regard to this stranger-beneficiary distinction, seems to indi-
cate the direction in which the law is moving.
ii. Borwege v. City of Owatonna, io Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915 (1933) ; Welch
v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, go N. H. 337, 9 A. (2d) 76I (i939). See Dillon v.
Rockaway Beach Hospital and Dispensary, 284 N. Y. 176, 179, 3o N. E. (2d) 373, 374
(940).
2. Justices Rutledge, Miller, and Edgeworth.
13. If one follows the belief that liability tends to destroy the corporate fund and
is contrary to the donor's purpose, there can be no justification for the intermediate
doctrine imposing liability for the benefit of strangers and denying it when non-paying
beneficiaries are involved. Certainly a liability suit by a stranger is just as much a
burden on the charity as is that by a non-paying beneficiary.
x4. For a criticism of this implied waiver theory, see Feezer, Tort Liability of
Charities (1928) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 191, 202.
